Russia Uses Spare Refining Capacity to Cushion Drone Strike Damage

Russia’s refining sector has absorbed one of the most intense waves of Ukrainian drone strikes since the start of the war — and yet its overall oil processing has declined by only 3% this year. The narrow impact, according to industry sources, reflects Moscow’s ability to reroute workloads across idle refining units and restart capacity at a pace far quicker than many analysts expected.

Beginning early in 2025 and accelerating again from August through October, Ukrainian forces targeted at least 17 major Russian refineries, sending drones as far as 2,000 kilometers into the country. The strategy aimed to disrupt Moscow’s fuel supply chain, undermine frontline operations, and constrain the Kremlin’s critical oil revenues. At the height of the second strike wave, planned maintenance combined with drone damage pushed roughly 20% of national refining capacity offline — a significant stress test for the system.

But Russia, still the world’s second-largest crude exporter, managed to maintain refining levels at about 5.1 million barrels per day, only 6% below the same period last year. Over the January–October window, overall processing came in at roughly 220 million metric tons, a modest 3% decline.

The explanation, sources say, lies in Russia’s longstanding habit of running its refining system below maximum output. With around 6.6 million barrels per day of total installed capacity but far less routinely in use, the industry had enough reserve flexibility to restart dormant units, shift runs to unaffected plants, and execute rapid repairs.

Executives familiar with refinery operations — speaking anonymously due to the sensitivity of the issue — said most large facilities maintain multiple parallel distillation lines, allowing operators to bring spare units online within days. Several refineries that sustained damage earlier in the year also completed interim repairs quickly enough to resume operations before subsequent strikes. The result is a system strained, but not crippled.

Still, the pressure is real. Kyiv claims the strikes have cut Russian gasoline supplies by as much as 20%. The International Energy Agency reported that Russia’s oil revenue fell to one of its lowest points since 2022 during the late summer, reflecting both export curbs and market disruptions. Moscow, however, insists domestic supply remains stable.

Beyond the immediate operational challenge, the attacks expose Russia’s vulnerability to foreign technology and spare parts — a lingering consequence of Western sanctions. For decades, major refinery upgrades were performed by European engineering firms, leaving operators dependent on imported components. Russian companies now say they have ramped up domestic production of specialized equipment and increased purchases from Chinese suppliers, but industry sources acknowledge repair times remain longer and costs significantly higher.

The early 2025 attacks struck key facilities including Ryazan, Volgograd, Tuapse, Saratov, Ufa, and Astrakhan. The second wave in August targeted refineries in Novokuibyshevsk, Kirishi, and Salavat, among others. Several were hit multiple times, forcing shutdowns of primary distillation units and vacuum systems — the heart of refining operations.

Russia responded by tightening air defenses around industrial sites, redirecting assets previously concentrated near strategic infrastructure. Even so, Ukraine’s long-range drones have demonstrated an ability to reach deep into Russian energy territory, raising questions about how sustainable Moscow’s spare-capacity strategy will be if attacks continue into 2026.

Industry analysts say Russia’s refining network was never designed to operate at full tilt; rather, it was built to accommodate decades of fluctuating domestic fuel demand and export economics. That slack capacity is now acting as a buffer. But the cushion is finite. Repeated damage increases maintenance backlogs, reduces redundancy, and compounds the difficulty of sourcing replacement equipment under sanctions.

For now, Russia appears able to keep the downstream system functioning — replacing lost capacity with idle units, patching damaged facilities, and rotating crude volumes regionally. But the ongoing drone campaign has forced the Kremlin to curtail some fuel exports and prioritize domestic allocation, tightening supplies in certain regions and heightening market uncertainty.

Both sides understand the stakes. For Ukraine, the strategy aims to pressure Russia’s financial core without the need for large conventional strikes. For Moscow, sustaining refinery output is essential not only to military operations but also to export revenue, budget stability, and the broader economic narrative it presents to the public.

Whether spare capacity will continue to offset damage depends on the frequency and sophistication of future attacks — and on how effectively Russia can repair, shield, and adapt its refining infrastructure under sanctions. For now, the system is holding, but the margin for error is narrowing.